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United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.:
Corporate Employee Criminal Liability
Under RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act' (RCRA)
was enacted to "promote the protection of health and the en-
vironment and to conserve valuable mineral and energy re-
sources."2 One way of accomplishing these objectives is
through regulation of the "treatment, storage, transportation,
and disposal of hazardous wastes which have adverse effects
on health and the environment."3 To assure compliance with
RCRA, Congress included certain criminal provisions in the
regulatory scheme.4
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.8 (Johnson &
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1982) (Objectives).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(4) (1982). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491 Part I, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6241.
4. Criminal penalties under RCRA are contained in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982)
which provides in pertinent part:
(d) Any person who . . .
(2) Knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identi-
fied or listed under this subchapter either-
(A) Without having obtained a permit under Section 6925 of this title
.;or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permits; . . . shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more
than $25,000 ($50,000 in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)) for
each day of violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year (two years
in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both.
See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491 Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6269 where it is noted that:
This section also provides for criminal penalties for the person who
disposes of any hazardous waste without a permit under this title .... The
use of criminal penalties are sufficiently narrow in that they only apply to
those who knowingly transport hazardous wastes to a facility which does not
have a permit, the actual disposal of hazardous wastes without a permit, or
the falsification of documents, all of which are more serious offenses than the
other provisions of the hazardous waste title.
5. 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
1
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Towers), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered, in a question of first impression, whether
RCRA's broad statutory definition of "person" should extend
the statute's criminal provisions to include individual employ-
ees of a company regulated by the Act. The court held that
the class of potential defendants covered under the Act's
criminal provisions include, in addition to "owners and opera-
tors" of a facility, employees who "knowingly treat, store, or
dispose of any hazardous waste [without having obtained a
permit]. ' 7 The standard announced by the court exempts em-
ployees from criminal prosecution unless they knew or should
have known that their employer failed to comply with the
Act's permit requirement.8 The court did, however, allow for
the trier of fact to infer the requisite knowledge on the basis
of the employee's job responsibilities.'
Part I of this note discusses Johnson & Towers with re-
spect to the court's interpretation of the terms "any person"
and "knowingly" as they appear in the Act's criminal provi-
sions. Part II follows with an analysis of the case and a discus-
sion of the potential deterrent effect criminal enforcement of
RCRA might have on responsible corporate employees en-
gaged in the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes. Finally, Part
III concludes that if environmental statutes, of which RCRA
is but one, are to achieve their objectives, it is the duty of the
judiciary to interpret and apply them in a manner consistant
with their purpose.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1982) ("The term person means an individual, trust,
firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partner-
ship, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or
any interstate body.").
7. 741 F.2d at 664-65. RCRA permit requirements are contained in 42 U.S.C. §
6925 which provides in relevant part:
(a) [Elach person owning or operating a facility for the treatment, storage,
or disposal of hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter [is
required] to have a permit issued pursuant to this section. . . . [T]he treat-
ment, storage or disposal of any such hazardous waste is prohibited except in
accordance with such a permit.
8. 741 F.2d at 665.
9. Id. at 669.
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I. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.
A. The Facts and the District Court Decision
Located in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc. is in the business of repairing and rebuilding heavy
machinery. The manner of disosing of caustic and chemical
degreasers containing toxic materials 0 used in the company's
operations was the gravamen of the criminal prosecutions. In
June 1981, federal agents allegedly observed company employ-
ees empty a holding tank containing waste chemicals from the
company's cleaning operation into a trench located near the
plant building." A search warrant was obtained and surveil-
lance continued. 2 The warrant was executed the following
day when disposal of liquid was again observed. Analysis of
the liquid and soil samples seized indicated the presence of
hazardous wastes.' 3
In March 1983, a federal grand jury returned a five count
indictment against Johnson & Towers, Inc. and two company
employees, Jack Hopkins, a foreman, and Peter Angel, the
service manager of the trucking department."' The indictment
charged the two employees with having "'managed, super-
vised and directed a substantial portion of Johnson & Towers'
10. Specifically, the degreasers contained two volatile organic toxic pollutants:
methylene chloride and trichloroethylene. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.
741 F.2d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985). See also 40
C.F.R. § 122. App. D (1984).
11. Brief for Appellant at 5, 6, United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d
662 (3d Cir. 1984).
12. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, RCRA Inspection Manual 7/24/81
(wherein inspectors are advised to obtain warrants).
13. Brief for Appellant, supra note 11, at 6.
14. Three counts of the indictment charged RCRA violations under 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(1982). The two other counts alleged conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982),
and a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act criminal provision, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1982). In addition, the individual defendants were charged with each
substantive count under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) which provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principle.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
pui.ishable as a principle.
[Vol. 2
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operations ... including those related to the treatment, stor-
age, and disposal of the hazardous wastes and pollutants' and
that the chemicals were discharged by 'the defendants and
others at their direction.'""' The company pled guilty to the
three RCRA counts and concurrent $20,000 fines were im-
posed.1" The two individual defendants, however, pled not
guilty and moved to dismiss the RCRA counts of the indict-
ments. In September 1983, the district court granted the de-
fendants' motions to dismiss the substantive RCRA counts,
but held that the individual defendants could be tried for aid-
ing and abetting the corporate RCRA violations. 7
At issue in the district court was whether liability under
the RCRA criminal provisions could attach to corporate em-
ployees who were neither owners nor operators of the facility.
The court ruled "that the RCRA criminal provision applies
only to 'owners and operators, " i.e., those obligated to obtain
a permit."19 Thus the court interpreted "person," as used in
Section 6928(d)(2)(A) of the Act, to exclude the individual de-
fendants. Following the district court's denial for reconsidera-
tion the government filed notice of appeal to the Third
Circuit.20
B. The Decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
1. The Parameters of "Any Person" Within RCRA
On review, the Third Circuit first considered whether an
employee could be considered a "person" under the RCRA
criminal provisions by turning to the text of Section
15. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 664.
16. Brief for Appellant, supra note 11, at 3.
17. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 664. See supra note 14.
18. Regarding the definition of "operators," the district court relied on 40 C.F.R.
§ 260.10 (1982) where "operator" is defined as "the person responsible for the overall
operation of a facility." Using a "primary control" standard, the district court found
the individual defendants to fall outside the class. United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc., 741 F.2d n.2 at 664.
19. Id. at 664.
20. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 664. The court of ap-
peals had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 which allows for appeal from the dis-
missal of a portion of the indictment.
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6928(d)(2)(A). 2 1 Observing that Congress might have more ex-
plicitly phrased the section,2" the court found the relevant
statutory language supportive of neither the expansive inter-
pretation suggested by the prosecution nor the restrictive con-
struction proffered by the defense. 3 Instead, the court
adopted the definition of "person" set forth in Section
6903(15) of the Act. 24
Noting the sole basis for exculpation under the plain lan-
guage" of Section 6928(d)(2)(A) to be compliance with the
Act's permit, requirement, the court nevertheless elected to
construe RCRA's criminal provisions by focusing on the stat-
ute's regulatory purpose as well as congressional intent." Rec-
ognizing RCRA's public policy of protecting the health and
welfare of the American public, the court turned for guidance
to federal decisional law concerning other public health stat-
utes. The court's review of case law led to United States v.
Dotterweich,27 where the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed the reversal of a corporate president's conviction
21. See supra note 4.
22. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 665.
23. Id. The government contended that § 6928(d)(2)(A) reaches "anyone who
handles hazardous waste without a permit." On the other hand, the defendants ar-
gued that the section is merely an "administrative enforcement mechanism applying
only to those who come within section 6925 and fail to comply." See also supra note
7. In addition, the defendants contended that since the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7413(c)(3) (1982), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(3) (1982) include "any responsible corporate officer" in their statutory defini-
tion of "person," the absence of similar language in RCRA supported the district
court findings. The court of appeals concluded, however, that such additions serve "to
expand rather than limit the class of potential defendants." Id. n. 3 at 665.
24. See supra note 6.
25. A fundamental canon of statutory construction, deeply rooted in common
law, is the "plain meaning doctrine." This primary rule asserts that the grammatical
and ordinary sense of a word is to be adhered to "unless that would lead to some
absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency, but no further." Grey v. Pearson, 26
Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 473, 6 H. L. Cas. 61 (1857). See also Llewellyn, Canons of
Construction, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
26. 741 F.2d at 666 ("[T]hough the result may appear harsh, it is well estab-
lished that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect pub-
lic health, . . . are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose.").
27. 320 U.S. 277, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 815 (1943), rev'g. United States v. Buf-
falo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1942).
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under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2" The court
of appeals' decision in that case was based on a narrow read-
ing of the statutory term "any person" in the context of defin-
ing criminal liability." In rejecting the lower court's limiting
construction, the Supreme Court held that "the offense
[criminalized by the act] is committed . . . by all who . . .
have . . . a responsible share in the furtherance of the trans-
action which the statute outlaws."30 The Court, while ac-
knowledging possible hardships on persons oblivious to their
criminal behavior, grounded its decision on a congressional in-
tent to place the burden "upon those who have at least the
opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of condi-
tions imposed for the protection of consumers . . . rather
than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are
wholly helpless."31 Dotterweich thus upheld the concept of
safeguarding public health through legislation specifically
designed to "enlarge and stiffen the penal net"3 for possible
defendants.
In Johnson & Towers the Third Circuit found the statu-
tory construction analysis of Dotterweich to be guiding.3 3 Ap-
plying the Dotterweich approach, the court studied RCRA's
legislative history and concluded that "[i]t would undercut
the purposes of [RCRA] to limit the class of potential defen-
dants to owners and operators when others also bear responsi-
bility for handling regulated materials." 3' The court's analy-
sis, like that in Dotterweich, accorded deference to the
particular nature of the legislation under review. The Dot-
terweich Court imputed a broad definition to the term "any
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938).
29. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because an important question regard-
ing the interpretation of the Act was raised by the court of appeals' reversal of the
conviction "[o]n the ground that only the corporation was the 'person' subject to
prosecution unless, perchance, Buffalo Pharmacal was a counterfeit corporation serv-
ing as a screen for [the individual defendant] Dotterweich." United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. at 279.
30. Id. at 284.
31. Id. at 284-85.
32. Id. at 282.
33. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 666.
34. Id. at 667.
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person" as used in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
so as not to frustrate the congressional purpose of safeguard-
ing public health through the regulation of drug shipments.35
Similarly, the Johnson & Towers court gave an expansive
reading to the identical term, as used in RCRA, so as not to
negate congressional efforts to "control hazards that, 'in the
circumstances of modern industrialization are largely beyond
self-protection.' "36 With respect to the question of the indi-
vidual defendants' employment responsibilities - a primary
factor for the imputation of criminal liability - the court,
again relying on Dotterweich, opined that the issue "can best
be left to 'the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of
trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries.' ,,37
2. The "Knowingly" Requirement
Having found the individual defendants to at least argua-
bly fall within the ambit of the RCRA criminal provisions, the
Third Circuit next addressed the section's use of the word
"knowingly" with respect to the government's burden in prov-
ing elements of a Section 6928(d)(2)(A) violation. The court
rejected as "overly literal"38 the prosecution's contention that
"knowingly" refers only to "treats, stores or disposes," 39 and
that therefore it need not prove whether the defendants had
knowledge concerning either the EPA classification of the
waste material, or whether the facility had in fact applied for
or received the necessary permit.40 Turning to decisional law
for guidance, the court found the analysis of United States v.
Marvin 4 to be "appropriate.' '42 In Marvin the government ar-
35. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 282.
36. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 667, quoting United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
37. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 670, quoting United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
38. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
39. See supra note 4.
40. See supra note 7.
41. 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983). Briefly, the
court in Marvin was faced with the issue whether Congress, in enacting the Food
Stamp Program, chose "to exercise its power to disregard the maxim actus non facit
[Vol. 2
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gued that since the illegal purchase of food stamps was "a so-
called 'regulatory offense,' ,,13 as opposed to a traditional com-
mon law crime, mens rea need not be proved. The court dis-
missed this contention by noting that whenever Congress
wishes to dispense with the conventional mens rea require-
ment, "it must manifest its intention by 'affirmative instruc-
tion.' ",44 In sum, the Marvin court looked first to the plain
language of the statute and upon finding an ambiguity turned
to the legislative history. The court stressed that before "dis-
plac[ing] a time honored principle of criminal jurisprudence
such as mens rea, Congressional intent must be found to be
unequivocal. 4 5
The statutory language before the Johnson & Towers
court paralleled the statutory language considered in Marvin.
In Johnson & Towers a central issue was whether "know-
ingly," as used in Section 6928(d)(2), modifies section (2) ex-
clusively - thereby rendering subsection (A), where the word
does not appear, an absolute liability offense; or whether mod-
ification of "knowingly" to subsection (A) should be judicially
inferred - thereby creating a uniform "knowingly" standard
for the entire section."6 While acknowledging a policy in deci-
sional law against statutory modification through inference,
the Third Circuit nonetheless found the first alternative to be
"arbitrary and nonsensical when applied to this statute. 4 7
Embracing the latter construction, the court held "knowingly"
to modify both Section (2) and subsection (A).4 8 Conse-
quently, the prosecution was not altogether relieved of the
reum, nisi mens sit rea." Id. at 1226. (An act does not render one guilty, unless the
mind is guilty.)
42. 741 F.2d at 669.
43. United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d at 1226.
44.. Id. at 1226, quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952).
45. Id. The Johnson & Towers court, however, cited United States v. Behrman,
255 U.S. 280 (1922) and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) in support of the
proposition that in "a 'public welfare statute,' there would be a reasonable basis for
reading the statute without any mens rea requirement." United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 668.
46. See supra note 4.
47. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 668.
48. Id. at 669.
1985]
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
burden of proving at trial the defendants' state of mind. How-
ever, the Third Circuit followed United States v. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemicals Corp.9 in its determination that
in the prosecution of "certain regulatory statutes requiring
'knowing' conduct the government need only prove knowledge
of the actions taken and not the statute forbidding them. 650
In discussing the lower court's eventual charge to the jury, the
court directed the trial judge to
instruct the jury, inter alia, that in order to convict each
defendant the jury must find that each knew that John-
son & Towers was required to have a permit, and knew
that Johnson & Towers did not have a permit. Depending
on the evidence, the district court may also instruct the
jury that such knowledge may be inferred. 1
II. Analysis
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.52 clarifies the
scope of the criminal provisions contained in RCRA. All em-
ployees holding "requisite responsible positions with the cor-
porate defendant" 53 are potential individual defendants if the
government can demonstrate at least an inference of individ-
ual knowledge related to the elements of a Section
6928(d)(2)(A) violation. Moreover, should the decision have a
deterrent effect, the potential to achieve meaningful strides
toward assuring "the protection of health and the environ-
49. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
50. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 669. The defendants
argued that due to the complexity of RCRA, responsibility for statutory compliance
should rest on the facility's "owners and operators." It is of interest to note that on
November 11, 1980, Johnson & Towers' chief engineer allegedly notified EPA that
the company "was a 'small quantity generator' and was not subject to present regula-
tions." Brief for Appellee Angel at 7, United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). See generally Russell, Managing Your Environmental Audit,
Chemical Engineering, June 24, 1985, at 37 (wherein the author describes environ-
mental audits in general, and offers suggestions and checklists for both internal and
outside audits).
51. Id. at 669.
52. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
53. Id. at 670.
[Vol. 2
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ment"'I is enhanced.
At the core of Johnson & Towers is the issue whether
Section 6928(d)(2)(A) includes employees as well as owners
and operators of a regulated facility even though the employ-
ees in question may not have been in a position to secure the
necessary EPA permit.55 After finding that Congress had not
explicitly defined "person" within the disputed section, the
court "view[ed] the statutory language in its totality" 56 and
adopted the broad definition set forth in Section 6903(15). s
One basis for this expansive interpretation is anchored in the
public health aspects of RCRA. 5 The Third Circuit's reliance
on United States v. Dotterweich59 and United States v.
Parke is of interest in that while those cases also involved the
enforcement of federal public health statutes, the issue in
both concerned the criminal liability of corporate officers as
opposed to non-officer employees. 61
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Coffee, "No Soul to
Damn; No Body to Kick:" An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981).
55. See supra note 7. The thrust of the defendants' argument, simply stated, was
that because § 6925 applies only to "owners and operators" of a facility, the criminal
penalties under § 6928 (d)(2)(A) should similarly apply only to "owners and opera-
tors." United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 665.
56. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 665.
57. See supra note 6. The Johnson & Towers court further observed that "[hiad
Congress meant section 6928(d)(2)(A) to take aim more narrowly, it could have used
more narrow language." Id. at 665. See also Watson, Hare, Davidson & Case, Hazard-
ous Wastes Handbook, Chap. 9-11, (1982 Partial Revision 1984) (noting that action
under Section 6973 (a), (b), Imminent Hazard, "is authorized against any 'person'
which is broadly defined [in section 6903(15), Definitions]").
58. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 666. In support of the
proposition that "criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to pro-
tect public health ... are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose," the
court relied on United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); and United States v. Freezo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). See generally Comment, Criminal
Enforcement of Federal Water Pollution Laws in an Era of Deregulation, 73 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 642 (1982).
59. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
60. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
61. See supra note 58. See also Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An
Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L. J. 73 (1976).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss2/7
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Dotterweich, as noted, 2 affirmed the proposition that
criminal liability may be imputed to a corporate officer having
a "responsible share in the furtherance of the [criminalized]
transaction." 63 This view was based on the Supreme Court's
unwillingness "to defeat the very object""' of legislation en-
acted to safeguard the health of the American public.
Park reaffirmed the vitality of Dotterweich. In Park the
criminal liability of a corporate officer was held to rest upon
whether "by virtue of the relationship he bore to the corpora-
tion .. . [the individual] . . .had the power to prevent the
act complained of." 5 Therefore, in applying a Dotterweich-
Park approach a two-pronged inquiry seems warranted: First,
a determination as to the employee's position within the cor-
porate structure; and second, an analysis of the employee's job
responsibilities with respect to actual, apparent or implied au-
thority to correct or rectify statutory violations of the corpo-
rate employer. Employing such an analysis could aid a court
in determining whether an arguable nexus between the indi-
vidual's placement within the particular corporate chain of
command and his power to prevent criminal activity by the
corporation existed at the time of the offense. Application of
the first prong appears basic in that a trier of fact could elect
to look no further than the individual's job title." On the
other hand, the second prong - which presents a more com-
plex question of fact - permits inquiry into, among other fac-
62. See also Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses - A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 463 (1981);
Notes, Rule 10b-5- The Equivalent Scope of Liability Under Respondeat Superior
and Section 20(a) - Imposing a Benefit Requirement on Apparent Authority, 35
Vand. L. Rev. 1383 (1982).
63. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. See also supra notes 27-37
and accompanying text.
64. Id. at 282.
65. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. at 642. See also United States v. Starr, 535
F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1976) (where the court refers to a "standard of 'foresight and
vigilance.' ").
66. In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d n.1 at 664, the court
noted discrepancies in the descriptions of the individual defendants' job titles and
responsibilities provided by the parties. The element of "responsibility" seems to
reach the "should have known" aspect of the suggested charge to the jury. See also
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2
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tors, the employee's job description, the past practice of the
employer and the corporate employment manual, if any.6 7
Job title and scope of employment responsibilities not-
withstanding it appears that a threshold inquiry for courts in-
terpreting public health and safety legislation should concern
the precise act criminalized by the statute.68 In Johnson &
Towers the Third Circuit's interpretation of "knowingly" in
terms of the "requisite proof" issue reflects an attempt to de-
fine the nature of the offense.6 9 In its analysis the court fol-
lowed the approach of United States v. Marvin70 in determin-
ing the scope of "knowingly" 71 and the standard of United
States v. International Minerals & Chemicals Corp.72 in al-
lowing the requisite knowledge to be inferred by the trier of
facts. Regarding the scope of the "knowingly" requirement,
the Johnson & Towers court applied Marvin in order to
achieve a "natural" reading of the statute." Concluding that
67. But see Abrams, supra note 62 at 477 (where the author cautions against
setting a standard "so high ... that in the corporate setting it is simply unfair to
impose criminal liability on the individual.").
68. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B), supra note 4, (providing criminal penalties for
noncompliance with a permit requirement or condition). See also H.Conf. Rep. No.
96-1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5028 at
5036, wherein the Joint Conference Committee observed that:
[Ejxisting law is unclear whether a violation of a permit condition consti-
tutes a criminal violation. The proposed section [6928(d)(2)] as amended
would eliminate the ambiguity by providing explicit penalties for knowingly
failing to comply with a material condition of the permit . . .[§ 6928 (d)(2)]
is intended to prevent abuses of the permit system by those who obtain and
then knowingly disregard them.
69. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 667-70.
70. 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983).
71. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
72. 402 U.S. 558 (1971). See also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
73. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 669. The Marvin court
allowed for a narrow inference of knowledge by asserting "the government had to
prove 'that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids'. . . [t]his does
not mean that the defendant must know, by chapter and verse, the precise law and
regulation ...[b]ut he must know that he was acting in violation of some law or
regulation." United States v. Marvin, 668 F.2d at 1227. But cf. United States v.
Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 245 (1983) (holding
18 U.S.C. § 922(e) not to be a specific intent crime, the Udofot court distinguished
Marvin because the firearms statute being considered "seek[s] to regulate dangerous
or harmful objects."). Query whether the regulation of hazardous wastes under RCRA
is at least as compelling as the regulation of firearms.
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"knowingly" modifies both subsections (2) and (A), 4 the court
held that before liability can be imputed to an actor, the stat-
ute demands at least inferrable knowledge that: (1) the indi-
vidual was disposing of what he knew to be hazardous waste;
75
and (2) the corporate entity had not obtained the required
EPA permit. With reference to RCRA's mens rea require-
ment,7e the court rejected the strict liability view set forth in
United States v. Behrman,77 and instead followed Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemicals which held that "under certain
regulatory statutes requiring 'knowing' conduct the govern-
ment need only prove knowledge of-the actions taken and not
the statute forbidding them. '7 8 Explicit in International Min-
erals & Chemicals is the presumption that when one is work-
ing with dangerous substances the likelihood of government
regulation is great enough to presume knowledge of at least
the existence of regulations.79 Accordingly, the court in John-
son & Towers provided for the possible inference of knowl-
edge on the part of the individual defendants.8 0 As a result,
although the Third Circuit felt compelled to read the "know-
ingly" requirement into all portions of Section 6928(d), the
statute's effectiveness was maintained by easing the degree of
74. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 669.
75. See also United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d at 835, 837 ("[A]n act is know-
ingly done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake, acci-
dent or some other innocent reason. . . [we hold that the Government did not have
to prove that appellant 'knowingly' violated the law, but only that appellant 'know-
ingly' delivered firearms or ammunition to the carrier.").
76. See H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5028, 5038 (where the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Confer-
ence Committee notes that "(tihe state of mind for all criminal violations under sec-
tion [6928] is 'knowing.' The conferees have not sought to define 'knowing' for of-
fenses under subsection (d); that process has been left to the courts under general
principles."). See also Costle & Beck, Attack on Hazardous Waste: Turning Back the
Toxic Tide, 9 Cap. U. L. Rev. 425, 430-31 ("[T]he judicial system will play a large
role in interpreting the RCRA program and clearly defining the penalties for non-
compliance required to do so safely and assume liability for their actions to assure
high standards of performance.").
77. 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922).
78. 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
79. See generally Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Har. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
80. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 669.
[Vol. 2
13
1985] U.S. v. JOHNSON & TOWERS
proof required for conviction by permitting inference of the
"knowingly" aspect.
Allowing responsible corporate employees to be held
criminally liable for the misdeeds of their employer raises
questions as to the practical impact of Johnson & Towers.
One significant jurisprudential aspect, not addressed by the
Third Circuit, is the decision's potential for curbing future il-
legal treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous waste
through the prosecution and punishment of convicted offend-
ers. If Johnson & Towers indeed stands for the proposition
that all employees holding "requisite responsible positions
with the corporate defendant" '81 are potentially criminally lia-
ble, the next step in the analysis - assuming conviction -
must address the issue of punishment. 52
Throughout the years various justifications for imposing
punishment have been advanced by commentators and schol-
ars."s The balance of this note, however, confines itself to but
one view - general deterrence. For purposes of our discus-
sion, general deterrence is defined as an effort to discourage
the commission of "similar wrongdoing by others through a
81. Id. at 670.
82. See supra note 4.
83. The following are illustrative of the various jurisprudential theories dealing
with justification for punishing criminal offenders: (1) Retribution, see, e.g., I. Kant,
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965)("Judicial punish-
ment . . . must in all cases be imposed only on the ground that [the offender] has
committed a crime."); (2) Retribution, see, e.g., J.F. Stephen, A History of the Crimi-
nal Law of England 81 (1883)("[T]he infliction of punishment by law gives definite
expression and a solemn ratification and justification to the hatred which is excited
by the commission of the offense."); E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society,
108, (Simpson trans. 1933)("[Punishment's] true function is to maintain social cohe-
sion intact, while maintaining all its vitality in the common conscience."); (3) Reha-
bilitation, see, e.g., Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Re-
garding Sentencing Reform, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 243, 254 (1979) ("[No treatment
program now used [to rehabilitate] is inherently either substantially helpful or harm-
ful. The critical fact seems to be the conditions under which the program is deliv-
ered." (emphasis in original)); and (4) Deterrence, see, e.g., J. Bentham, Principles of
Penal Law, Pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J. Bentham's Works 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed. 1843)
("[Crime] will be more successfully combatted [when] ... the law turns the profit of
balance against it."). See also United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-505
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (wherein several of the above jurisprudential views are discussed in
the context of determining the appropriate sentence for a convicted defendant).
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reminder that the law's warnings are real and that the grim
consequence [of punishment] is likely to follow.""'
While the deterrence theory of punishment could argua-
bly serve an educational function in the context of imposing
RCRA criminal liability on responsible employees, 85 the prac-
tical question is what type of punishment the sentencing court
should mete out. 6 The Johnson & Towers court recognized
that "criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes in-
tended to protect public health .. .are to be construed to
effectuate the regulatory purpose." 87 It could be argued that
to effectively halt the illegal disposal of hazardous materials,
RCRA must be strictly construed to impose liability on all
persons individually responsible for, or who arranged for, the
illegal disposal of hazardous waste. 8 Thus, while not having
the required permit is clearly a statutory violation not to be
downplayed, clearly the offense with the greatest potential for
harming health and the environment is the actual illegal dis-
posal of the waste.89 Consequently, courts must "continue to
develop a federal common law of pollution within the frame-
84. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 499. See also Blumstein et.al.
(Editors), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanc-
tions on Crime Rates 3 (1978) (wherein deterrence is defined as "the inhibiting effect
of sanctions on the criminal activity of people other than the sanctioned offender."
(emphasis in original)).
85. See, e.g., Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality, 43 J. Crim. L.
C. & P. S. 176 (1952).
86. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 949, 970 (1966) ("Experience seems to show that excessively severe penalties
may actually reduce the risk of conviction, thereby leading to results contrary to their
purpose."); Costle & Beck, supra note 76, at 431 (cautioning that undesirable effects
may result "if liability exposure is too great"). See also Pelaez, Of Crime - And
Punishment: Sentencing the White Collar Criminal, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 823 (1980). See
generally National Research Council, Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the
Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (1978).
87. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d at 666.
88. With respect to Superfund liability of corporate employees, see, e.g., United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 20 E.R.C. 1401 (W.D.Mo.
1984); United States v. Wade, 20 E.R.C. 1277 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
89. Of course not all damage to health and the environment is the result of ille-
gal activity. Often "sudden and unexpected occurrences such as operator error, equip-
ment malfunction, power failure, failure of cooling water, fire [and] flooding" cause
harmful emissions. Crocker, Preventing Hazardous Pollution During Plant Catastro-
phes, Chemical Engineering, May 4, 1970, at 97.
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work of the applicable statutes." 90
III. Conclusion
It must be remembered that in United States v. Johnson
& Towers, Inc. 91 the Third Circuit merely reinstated indict-
ments and allowed possibly responsible corporate employees
to be brought to trial. In the final analysis, the responsibility
for effectuating the legislative intent of RCRA's criminal pen-
alties falls squarely at the lower court level where penalties
are actually imposed. With respect to RCRA, the "justifica-
tion for the penalties section is to permit a broad variety of
mechanisms so as to stop the illegal disposal of hazardous
wastes '92 and the express legislative intent is to close "the last
remaining loophole in the environmental laws."9 In this con-
text, the Third Circuit's decision in Johnson & Towers is
sound. Had the court permitted a "loophole" through the cre-
ation of a non-owner, non-operator employee exemption the
effectiveness of Section 6928(d)(2)(A) would have been dimin-
ished thereby frustrating the congressional intent explicit in
the enactment of the penalties section. As a result, rather
than having a "working instrument of government" '94 to pro-
tect health and the environment, the American public would
have been left with a "[mere] collection of English words"95
which acknowledge the existence of a problem, but provide no
viable solution.
Robert T. McGovern
90. Riesel, Environmental Litigation, ALI-ABA Course of Study: Environmental
Law 246 (1984) (discussing the avoidance of federal statutes with respect to "such
critical issues as to whether or not joint and several liability is imposed upon respon-
sible parties."). See also Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate
Criminal Liability for Water Pollution, 10 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 576 (1980).
91. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
92. H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6269.
93. Id. at 4, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6241. See also Andersen, The Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. Rev.
635 (1978).
94. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
95. Id.
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